Tutti noi conosciamo più che bene le dinamiche dell'attacco di Pearl Harbour, ma io mi chiedo: perché oltre all'attacco navale i giapponesi non pianificarono un invasione delle Hawaii "a sorpresa"? Avrebbero tolto molta autonomia alla flotta usa, guadagnando tempo per aumentare il "drenaggio" di risorse verso il Giappone. Magari gli usa le avrebbero riconquistate in pochi mesi, ma in quel caso con una strategia di fare terra bruciata (ovvero demolire ogni infrastruttura) si avrebbe rallentato di molto la futura controffensiva americana.
Credo fosse letteralmente impossibile portare a termine con successo una occupazione delle Hawaii, portare li le truppe e rifornirle con successo sarebbe stata un'impresa proibitiva.
L'articolo però mi pare prenda in considerazione un'invasione da metà 1942 mentre Rio, se nin ho capito male, intende subito al 7 dicembre 1941
No. Se vai in fondo, c'è un'analisi dettagliata e molto interessante (e IMHO, assolutamente condivisibile) sul perchè fosse impossibile anche il 7-12-41 The order of battle on December 7th looked roughly like this: In other words, the Japanese had 11 divisions to play with to achieve their objectives in the Pacific. Next, let's examine what it takes to move those forces around. According to Mark Parillo, in "The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War", p.75, at the begining of the war Japan had roughly 6.5 million tons of shipping under her control. At the start of hostilities, the Imperial Army drafted 519 vessels of 2,160,500 tons, two thirds of which (1,450,000 tons worth) were intended for landing purposes. Of that, 1,350,000 tons was earmarked for the Philippines and Malayan operations. The Navy drafted another 1,740,200 tons, most of which was presumably devoted to sustaining the fleet in foreign waters. Thus, nearly 4 million tons of Japan's 6.5 million total tons of shipping was drafted for military purposes, leaving 2.6 million tons for the civilian economy (i.e. the people who make the guns and bullets). Not only that, but the civilian economy actually needed 10 million tons of shipping to supply it, the remainder having been made up before the war by cargo carried in foreign (mostly Allied) cargo ships. So in actuality, the Japan started the war 3.5 million tons in the hole. The Japanese economy was being expected to fight a major, multi-theatre war, while subsisting on 25% of its prewar shipping requirements! Taken as a whole, it is difficult to imagine how Japan could have freed up any additional shipping to increase the potential size of the amphibious pool. As a result, when constructing an early war strategic scenario, it is important to remember that the size of Japan's amphibious lift pool is stringently fixed. This pool was roughly sufficient to move eleven divisions around the Pacific and still keep the forces on the Chinese mainland in supply. This, in turn, rigidly restricted the potential scope of Japanese operations. In other words, Japan had to capture what it could with eleven divisions, and no more. ... One is drawn inevitably, then, to the conclusion that even if the Japanese had wanted to, they didn't have the ability to undertake both a Hawaiian operation and the intricate series of attacks which they envisioned unleashing against the Southwest Pacific. They had to make a choice. And given the rapidly depleting raw material stocks in the Empire, necessity dictated that the Indies be captured at all costs. A richer nation might have had the option of gambling and opting for an attack on a set of islands which possessed nothing in the way of raw materials. Japan in late 1941 could afford no such luxury.
Aggiungici l'assunto di base, e ti fai un'idea completa sul perchè venga preso in considerazione il 1942 in vece del fatidico 7/12/1941: Here are the basic assumptions of the scenario: - The Japanese reverse the outcome of the Battle of Midway and thus retain the services of all six of their large fleet carriers, while the United States Navy loses all three of theirs, and thus has but two left in the whole of the Pacific. - The Japanese have successfully captured Midway and are turning it into an advance base. - The Japanese can't mount an operation against Hawaii until August, 1942. This is based on Japanese aircraft losses at the Battle of Midway, which are assumed to be moderate to heavy. Historically, the initial raid on Midway cost the Japanese fourteen aircraft either lost or damaged beyond repair, and another twenty-six damaged to one degree or another, from a strike force of 108 aircraft. That's a 13% attrition rate in a single strike. It must be assumed that additional strikes would have been needed against Midway in order to destroy it's remaining aircraft. Similarly, the attacks against the American carriers during the historical battle were also costly. One of the strikes against Yorktown cost the Japanese 13 of the 18 Val dive-bombers involved. Given these sorts of attrition rates, it is difficult to imagine how the Japanese would have come away even from a victory at Midway without substantial losses of aircraft and crews. For the sake of argument, we will say that these losses are replaceable, but they will require two months to effect. This is not unreasonable, in light of Zuikaku's experience refitting her airwings after the Battle of Coral Sea, which took several months. So no offensive operations can be contemplated against Hawaii before August of 1942 at the earliest. And in reality, this is a generous estimate of the Japanese capability to mount the planning effort and mobilization of resources that such an operation would require. Allright then. Granted these conditions, let's examine the obstacles to Japan's succesful invasion of Hawaii in August 1942. They are several, and formidable. Stanotte mi ci sono impallato a leggerlo tutto e, cribbio, satana sa se non mi è presa la fregola di farlo in WitPAE...
