Il Programma Atomico Tedesco (e altre WMD) : dati ed ipotesi

L'ipotesi di GyJeX è molto pragmatica e quindi, seguendo il tuo ragionamento sul modo di pensare dei Tedeschi, potrebbe essere quella più corretta.

 

La discussione è stata lunga e complessa.

Io penso - come avevo già sottolineato - che su questo tema il passaggio chiave per cercare una interpretazione razionale stia negli interrogatori di Otto Ambros, Direttore Generale della IG Farben e all'epoca massimo esperto dei gas nervini.

Penso anche, quali ulteriori e fondamentali premesse, che :

a) Hitler non abbia mai pensato di arrendersi ;

b) Hitler non aveva scrupoli morali tali da rinunciare all'unico vero asso nella manica che aveva, dal 1943 in avanti, se avesse avuto un quadro reale della situazione.

Quindi ho ipotizzato un'altro scenario.

Hitler è stato disinformato sulla capacità dei nervini (pochissimi erano al corrente della letalità assoluta di quel gas) e SOPRATTUTTO sul fatto che la Germania ne avesse il monopolio assoluto.

Disinformato coscientemente e volutamente da Ambros, con la complicità di Speer, in una Conferenza 'chiave' avvenuta nel maggio 1943 (appena prima di Kursk !)

Qui i passaggi chiave tratti dall' interrogatorio di Otto Ambros, tenuto in un processo separato e successivo a quello principale, quello alla IG Farben (Trials on War Criminals before the NMT - Vol.VII - The IG Farben case - Ott.1946, aprile 1949 - 1616 pagine) - pg.1043 seguenti.

<< ...

Q. Well, go ahead, please; describe to us what happened at this conference.

A. He discussed the main types, always with a point of view of "How does it look on the other side?" and I reported objectively that, for example, in the Lost [mustard gas] field, countries which have a lot of ethylene would perhaps have the possibility to produce larger quantities of these substances than we could.

Thereupon he [Hitler - ndr] said: "I understand that the countries with petroleum are in a position to make more, but Germany has a special gas, Tabun. In this we have a monopoly in Germany."

At that moment I said: "I have justified reasons to assume that Tabun, too, is known abroad. I know that Tabun had been publicized as early as 1902 [sic !], that Sarin was patented [sic], and that these substances appeared in patents," and I said, "I am convinced that other countries, in case the German side might use these gases, would very shortly not only be able to imitate these special gases, but even produce them in much larger quantities."

... >>
Hitler sa che il Tabun è uno 'special gas' ma probabilmente non è stato informato sulla reale potenzialità militare, rispetto ai 'poison gas' della I.G.M., dei quali aveva avuto diretta conoscenza ...

Ambros racconta a Hitler due fondamentali bugie :

a) il Tabun ed il Sarin non furono ufficialmente brevettati dalla IG Farben, ma furono mantenuti assolutamente segreti e tutto il mondo ne rimase completamente all'oscuro, fino al 1945. !!! Le pubblicazioni del 1902 erano relative a 'precursori chimici' del Tabun, che non fu 'scoperto' che alla fine degli anni '30.

b) Hitler è convinto di avere il MONOPOLIO del micidiale Tabun (lo dice !), ma Ambros lo disillude, DISTORCENDO LA REALTA', facendo passare l'idea (falsa) che gli Alleati conoscessero questi gas da tempo e potessero a loro volta averne in dotazione o fabbricarne a volontà. (le ricerche americane di quegli anni erano relative a quello che sarebbe diventato il DDT), ed inducendo quindi Hitler a pensare che un uso dei nervini avrebbe scatenato la reazione e ritorsione immediata da parte degli Alleati, con le stesse armi.

In realtà la Germania a quella data (maggio 1943) disponeva almeno di 8/10.000 ton. di Tabun (sarebbero diventate 12.000 ton nel 1944) ed iniziava a produrre l'ancora più micidiale Sarin, mentre gli Alleati (ed i Russi) non ne sospettavano nemmeno l'esistenza ...

Il fatto stesso che i vari giudici, durante gli interrogatori, non distinguessero tra 'poison gas' (quelli della I GM) e 'nervini' è significativo della totale non conoscenza in materia, ancora nel 1946 !

Alla fine, Ambros non fu accusato di crimini di guerra (era implicato nella costruzione di Auschwitz, Monowitz ed altri campi, e nello sfruttamento schiavistico degli internati a favore della IG Farben) e venne invece rilasciato dopo pochi anni, andando a lavorare ... per la Dow Chemical. ...

Una scenario simile può forse essere ipotizzato anche per le ipotetiche 'mini-atomiche' tedesche del 1945, sui loro tests e - nel caso - sul mancato uso nelle ultime disperate settimane di guerra (vedasi i post precedenti). Hitler aveva perso il controllo delle ricerche più avanzate e coloro che le gestivano (Ambros per i gas; Kammler ed altri i progetti atomici e missilistici) avevano probabilmente preso decisioni 'autonome' ...

 

Un utile specchietto:

 

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/art...x-Nazis-developed-WMD-discovered-Austria.html

apperò

 

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/w...ear-bunker-discovered-in-austria-9948647.html

bello il video! Non hanno badato a spese per costruire la struttura!

 

Un nuovo documentario della ZDF sulla materia



http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/weird-news/hitlers-nazis-developed-atom-bomb-6166708

https://www.warhistoryonline.com/war-articles/nazi-abomb-flying-saucer.html

moltissime analogie con quanto affermato qui :

http://www.netwargamingitalia.net/f...-wmd-dati-ed-ipotesi.21954/page-7#post-323552

Nazi Germany may have perfected an atomic bomb and a ‘flying saucer’ to deliver it in the dying days of WW2.
Test were even carried out in which Russian prisoners of war were sacrificed to test the bomb’s efficiency, a German TV documentary claims. Had it been put into production, a Nazi bomb could have altered the outcome of the war.

‘The Search for Hitler’s Atom Bomb’ on the ZDF channel quotes from sealed records from Russia and America proving that secret and frenzied research brought the Third Reich close to a weapon of mass destruction.

The programme quotes interrogation reports of Nazi scientists, eyewitness accounts and records left behind by researchers, many of which were shipped to America after the war. Historian Matthia Uhl said the race to develop a Nazi A-bomb went into overdrive in the last year of the war as Germany was being defeated on every front.

The programme focuses on Hans Kammler, an S.S. general who was given 175,000 concentration camp inmates for slave labour in the V-weapons factories, tank production lines and building secret bunkers. Kammler was one of a very few Nazis who answered only to Hitler, who put him in charge of the race for nuclear fission.

One of his main projects – still classified by the Americans – was the Jonas Valley in Thuringia, eastern Germany,the supposed site of Hitler’s nuclear and space programmes. One test was said to have been carried out at the beginning of March 1945.

The US has placed a 100-year secrecy order on the files concerning the valley and what went on in the secret tunnels the Nazis carved into it.

ZDF quoted Soviet documents from Russian military intelligence agents who speak of two nuclear tests in Thuringia.
“The Germans are in the throes of making and testing a new secret weapon, which has a large destructive force,” said the Soviets.
“The available bomb has a diameter of 1.5 meters. It consists of interlocking hollow balls.”
Another Russian report said: “Communicated by our reliable source from Germany: the Germans have conducted two explosions in Thuringia with great force.”

Trees in the Jonas Valley were reportedly felled almost two thousand from the epicentre of the blast. The secret reports also claimed Russian prisoners of war “in the centre of the explosion were killed and often no trace remained of them. Also a strong radioactive effect has been observed.”

But the programme was unable to find where the weaponised uranium the Nazi scientists would have needed for the bomb came from, and admits many pieces of the Nazi atomic puzzle are still missing.

 

Dall'espresso di domenica

 

Gy che giornale è?

 

http://www.difesaonline.it/mondo-mi...-documenti-desecretati-raccontano-di-un-fungo

Cosa ne pensate?

 

Riporto in vita la discussione perché ho un dubbio su questa testimonianza: Schreiber fu chiamato a testimoniare dai russi stessi e nel brano che ho io della Jacobsen non vi è traccia di quello stralcio tra la domanda di Alexandrov e la risposta di Schreiber:
Alexandrov asked if the army high command knew about these experiments; Schreiber replied, “I assume so.”
“Will you kindly tell us precisely what the reason was for the decision of the OKW to prepare for bacteriological warfare?” Alexandrov asked.
“The defeat at Stalingrad,” Schreiber said, “led to a reassessment of the situation, and consequently to new decisions. It was no doubt considered whether new weapons could be used which might still turn the tide of war in our favor.”
“So why didn’t the Reich use biological weapons?” Alexandrov asked.
Instead of answering the question, General Schreiber went into minute detail regarding a meeting in March 1945 with Dr. Blome. “In March 1945, Professor Blome visited me at my office at the Military Medical Academy,” Schreiber recalled. “He had come from Posen and was very excited. He asked me whether I could accommodate him and his men in the laboratories at Sachsenburg so that they could continue their work there; he had been forced out of his institute at Posen by the advance of the Red Army. He had had to flee from the institute and he had not even been able to blow it up. He was very worried at the fact that the installations for experiments on human beings at this institute, the purpose of which was obvious, might be easily recognized by the Russians for what they were. He had tried to have the institute destroyed by a Stuka bomb but that, too, was not possible. Therefore, he asked me to see to it that he be permitted to continue work at Sachsenburg on his plague cultures, which he had saved,” Schreiber said.
Dr. Blome wasn’t on trial. Why was Schreiber spending so much of his testimony talking about Dr. Blome? “During his visit Blome told me that he could continue his work at an alternative laboratory in [Geraberg,] Thuringia,” Schreiber said, “but that this was not yet completed. It would take a few days or even a few weeks to complete it, and that he had to have accommodation until then. He added that if the plague bacteria were to be used when the military operations were so near to the borders of Germany, when units of the Red Army were already on German soil, it would, of course, be necessary to provide special protection for the troops and the civilian population. A serum had to be produced. Here again time had been lost, and as a result of all these delays it had never been possible to put the idea into effect.”
La mia edizione è Little, Brown and Company, ebook edition, 1st ed., 2014.
Ero curioso su questo particolare, a meno che non mi sia sbagliato a citare.
@GyJeX

 

Cosa manca esattamente ?

 

La parte della protesta americana, a meno che non mi sia perso qualcosa (non c'è intento polemico, è solo che mi sono imbattuto nella discussione e ho visto di avere il libro).

 

ah, beh, quando ho scritto il riassuntino in italiano sono andato a memoria, metti che m'è sfuggita una licenza poetica