Lo so. Ciò non toglie che, proprio per questo, io non possa cercare di descrivere il migliore dei mondi possibili, quello al quale tendere. Se invece accettiamo, passivamente, che sia giusto non sapere, in nome di un interesse superiore, quel mondo si allontanerà in un futuro ancora più remoto.
Credo che lo scopo del film di Stone non sia l'analisi tecnica dell'attentato quanto piuttosto le sue conseguenze, e quindi anche i moventi. Emblematico in questo sono, per esempio, anche le analisi dell'attentato dell'11 settembre: anche se fosse effettivamente possibile che 2 grattacieli di quel tipo collassassero in quel modo e che nello stesso giorno 4 aerei di linea si schiantassero atomizzandosi senza lasciare nemmeno una particella nel nostro universo, le conseguenze di quel gesto giustificherebbero ampiamente l'ipotesi del complotto, tanto da rendere qualunque altra ipotesi quantomeno fantasiosa.
Quello che non ho mai capito è perchè Oswald avrebbe scelto di sua spontanea volontà di fare da capro espiatorio (perlomeno se non crediamo alle fantasiose storie di controllo mentale) e, allo stesso modo, cosa ha spinto Jack Ruby ad autocondannarsi all'ergastolo uccidendolo prima di un processo.
Follia o denaro ? Alle 12:30 di venerdì 22.11.1963 Oswald spara a JFK, dal 6° piano della Texas School Book Depository sulla Dealey Plaza Dopo meno di mezz'ora la Polizia di Dallas diffonde l'identikit ... Alle 1:15 PM un poliziotto vede Oswald e cerca di fermarlo. Oswald lo uccide con 4 colpi di pistola. Inizia la caccia all'uomo, e alle 1:40 Oswald viene arrestato. Viene portato al Comando della Polizia di Dallas, dove verrà trattenuto ed interrogato per due giorni. Domenica 24.11.1963, Oswald deve essere trasferito alla prigione di Dallas. Alle ore 11:21, J.Ruby, uno sconosciuto, gli si avvicina tra la folla, in mezzo al cordone di poliziotti, e lo uccide ... Jack Leon Ruby (nato Jacob Leon Rubenstein), morirà di embolia polmonare il 3.1.1967, nel carcere di Dallas a 55 anni. Due pazzi ... ?
Jerusalem Post http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/When-Ben-Gurion-said-no-to-JFK By GERALD STEINBERG 03/29/2010 01:19 When Ben-Gurion said no to JFK THE CLASH began in 1960, when the outgoing Eisenhower administration sought an explanation for the mysterious construction near Dimona. It was told that this top-secret activity in the middle of the desert was a harmless textile plant, and no, it could not come and visit. Classified spy photos were then published on the front page of The New York Times (yes, the CIA spied on the Jewish state, with or without forged passports). When president Kennedy took office in 1961, the disagreement became a full-blown crisis. Like Obama, Kennedy was not inherently hostile (unlike Jimmy Carter), but he did not have a special sympathy for the Jewish people. His advisers urged continuous pressure, assuming that Israel would have no choice but to accept US demands. Every high-level meeting or communication repeated the demand for inspection of Dimona. One form of pressure was to deny Ben-Gurion an invitation to the White House – his May 1961 meeting with Kennedy was a low-key affair at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York, and was dominated by this issue. In some ways, Israel was far weaker than is the case today. Before 1967, the IDF was not seen as a formidable power, and the economy depended on massive aid from Diaspora Jewry. If the US government were to impose tax restrictions, the costs would have been very high. Ben-Gurion avoided saying no by dancing around them for two years. Finally, Kennedy had enough, and in a personal letter dated May 18, 1963, the president warned that unless American inspectors were allowed into Dimona (meaning the end of any military activities), Israel would find itself totally isolated. Rather than answering, Ben-Gurion abruptly resigned. Kennedy’s repeated emphasis on America’s “deep commitment to the security of Israel” was all well and good, but, as seen after Egypt’s sudden expulsion of UN peacekeepers in 1967, Israel could not depend on anyone – even the US. Ben-Gurion’s successor, Levi Eshkol received Kennedy’s next letter, which upped the pressure, warning that the American commitment and support of Israel “could be seriously jeopardized.” Later, after Lyndon Johnson became president following Kennedy’s assassination, the issue resurfaced, with threats of an American conventional arms embargo. But Eshkol followed Ben-Gurion’s precedent. Similarly, in 1969, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger made one more effort to force Israel to relinquish the deterrent option, and when Golda Meir refused, the US and Israel agreed to the “don’t ask, don’t tell” compromise, that has served both countries well for more than 40 years. - - - White House - May 18, 1963 Dear Mr. Prime Minister [Ben Gurion] : I welcome your letter of May 12 and am giving it careful study. ... I am sure you will agree that there is no more urgent business for the whole world than the control of nuclear weapons. We both recognized this when we talked together two years ago, and I emphasized it again when I met with Mrs. Meir just after Christmas. The dangers in the proliferation of national nuclear weapons systems are so obvious that I am sure I need not repeat them here. It is because of our preoccupation with this problem that my Government has sought to arrange with you for periodic visits to Dimona. When we spoke together in May 1961 you said that we might make whatever use we wished of the information resulting from the first visit of American scientists to Dimona and that you would agree to further visits by neutrals as well. I had assumed from Mrs. Meir's comment that there would be no problem between us on this. We are concerned with the disturbing effects on world stability which would accompany the development of a nuclear weapons capability by Israel. I cannot imagine that the Arabs would refrain from turning to the Soviet Union for assistance if Israel were to develop a nuclear weapons capability - with all the consequences this would hold. But the problem is much larger than its impact on the Middle East. Development of a nuclear weapons capability by Israel would almost certainly lead other larger countries, that have so far refrained from such development, to feel that they must follow suit. As I made clear in my press conference of May 8, we have a deep commitment to the security of Israel. In addition this country supports Israel in a wide variety of other ways which are well known to both of us. [4-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] ... Sincerely, John F. Kennedy - - - White House - July 5, 1963 Dear Mr. Prime Minister [ Eshkol ], It gives me great personal pleasure to extend congratulations as you assume your responsibilities as Prime Minister of Israel. You have our friendship and best wishes in your new tasks. It is on one of these that I am writing you at this time. You are aware, I am sure, of the exchange which I had with Prime Minister Ben-Gurion concerning American visits to Israel,s nuclear facility at Dimona. Most recently, the Prime Minister wrote to me on May 27. ... As I wrote Mr. Ben-Gurion, this Government's commitment to and support of Israel could be seriously jeopardized if it should be thought that we were unable to obtain reliable information on a subject as vital to the peace as the question of Israel's effort in the nuclear field. Knowing that you fully appreciate the truly vital significance of this matter to the future well-being of Israel, to the United States, and internationally, I am sure our carefully considered request will have your most sympathetic attention. Sincerely, John F. Kennedy - - - Decisamente un Presidente scomodo, con molti potenti nemici ... - - - P.S. Nel 1967 Israele, nella guerra dei 6 giorni, occupò la Palestina, il Golan ed il Sinai. Nel 1973, durante la guerra del Kippur, Golda Meir minacciò l'uso dell'atomica per avere il supporto americano di cui le IDF disperatamente necessitavano ...
